While
teaching at the American University in Cairo, three mornings a week I took a
bus from Zamalek, an island in the middle of the Nile, to the campus in the
desert far on the eastern edge of the urban area. The newly-built or expanded freeways and roads are crowded
with cars and private buses. I had
time to reflect on some of the problems of the Egyptian economy of which this
is the initial installment.
The first time I lived in Cairo for
an extensive period of time was 1980.
Then foreigners were often surprised by how crowded the public transport
system, almost exclusively made up of buses, was. Buses were more than full. Passengers felt packed in and would sometimes have to hang
to each other on the steps at the doors.
Entry and exit sometimes resembled an athletic competition as the driver
slowed but did not stop to allow people to jump off and on.
The
Mubarak government solved the problem of an overcrowded public transit system:
it largely dismantled it. The two
lines of the subway system that run north and south are cheap, efficient and
well-run but they don’t get most Cairenes where they need to go. And therein hangs a tale not only of
urban inconvenience but also of a transit system which is, in one way that
economists think about these things, highly efficient. Unfortunately it is therefore a system
that imposes profound costs on both the public and the private sectors and
makes firms within them less and less profitable over time.
Much
has been written about Cairo traffic:
how much time it can take to travel even short distances, how much
pollution it produces, how annoying it is. These accounts tell us quite a bit about how traffic affects
the consumer (or user, if you prefer).
People waste quite a bit of time; poor health whether due to the prompt
effects of pollution or high blood pressure extract resources from
society.
Looking
at transportation, especially public transit, this way isn’t obviously
wrong. It accords with a prominent
critique of economics (usually phrased as a criticism of “neoliberalism” or
“globalization”) that is very popular in area studies generally and Middle East
studies in particular. Public
policy, it seems, is privileging firms by making ordinary people bear the costs
of transportation in private. This
looks very similar to the kinds of policies that have also led, in Egypt, to
investments that have created gated communities (Dream Land) or upper class
suburban environments (Qatamiyyah or Sixth of October City).
The
provision of transportation by firms or agencies for their workers seems like a
plausible work-around. And, in a
sense it is. It’s one of those
conveniences that seem to increase the income of workers. So, too, the provision of housing or
medical care, or any of the other non-cash sources of income that firms and
public agencies often provide their workers. And taking them away would clearly decrease income available
for other purposes.
But
in fact the provision of transportation (or housing or any other good) isn’t
best thought of as an increase in income to workers. Historically the provision of in-kind income has served two
purposes. One is to overcome the
weakness in existing markets for particular goods. The other purpose is to tie workers to the workplace. The second goal is usually predicated
on existing imperfections or shortcomings in labor markets or product
markets. In 19th
century England and early 20th century Egypt, it was common for
factory owners to provide housing, groceries and other goods directly to
workers. This was frequently
necessary because the available stock of housing, other commodities or services
was initially so small as either to be physically unavailable or available only
at exorbitant market prices. Thus
the provision of goods and services in-kind substituted for the inability of
prevailing money wages to command what workers needed to live. In such conditions, however, owners
rapidly found (if they did not already know it) that the provision of such
in-kind income made workers dependent on the owners and far more amenable to
factory discipline. To lose one’s
job was immediately to lose one’s home or access to a store.
In
the absence of effective markets, workers accepted the provision of in-kind
income but resented it.
They especially resented the control over their lives it provided owners
but they were aware that they were also being provided with inferior
goods at monopoly prices.
Generally trade unions attempted to end the provision of in-kind wages
and substitute higher (and presumably more nearly adequate) money wages.
Owners
were also frequently more than willing to move away from the provision of
in-kind income. What owners
realized was that what looked like income to workers frequently involved capital
investments that were less profitable than their core business. What looked like in-kind income to
workers was often, it turned out, an unprofitable charge on capital. Mill owners discovered they were participants
in a very illiquid housing market with sunk and essentially irrecoverable
capital charges. Or they were in
the grocery business with perishable goods and a workforce they found difficult
to monitor.
Or,
in the case of many industrial firms and government agencies in Egypt today,
they find they are in the transportation business. They must buy and maintain vehicles, employ drivers, insure
them, and monitor them to ensure that only people who are employed are using
them. If they don't do it themselves they have to rent all these services from companies that specialize in them. Thinking of this as a
charge on the firm’s capital indicates the problem: it makes the firm less profitable by directly reducing the
return on equity. Providing
transportation is a cost of doing business as much as the shipping of raw
materials in or finished products out.
In exchange for higher taxes, firms could get out of the business of running
their own transportation systems.
They would leave that, generally unprofitable, business to the state. Americans should, by the way, pay
attention to this because without significant investments in public transit and
rising gasoline prices it is easy to imagine that firms here will find themselves
in the transportation business in the future.
In
the 1990s Egyptian policy makers made a decision to rely on private cars
(including a vastly expanded taxi fleet), mini-buses and micro-buses many of
which were privately owned, and a light-rail system that linked previously
existing northern and southern routes.
The explosive growth of these forms of transportation has occurred
thanks to subsidized prices for gasoline and diesel that are only small
fractions of world price as well as the constant construction of new highways
in ever more vain attempts to ease congestion.
Relying
on privately owned small vehicles is “efficient” as economists sometimes use
the term. You can get anywhere you
want to go and you can get there as comfortably as you desire. As long as you pay the price. Indeed you can even choose between a
white cab with a meter or a black cab in which you and the driver bargain over
the fare before you depart.
Efficient as the system is individually it has enormous costs socially,
not the least of which is that during rush hour average
speeds can drop to five kilometers an hour. The conundrum, as in many parts of the world, is that
despite the vast technical advances of the past century you must frequently
travel at less than the speed a donkey or a horse would have taken you a
century ago.
There
are other ways to organize transportation and many other “Third World”
countries have employed them as Egypt could have. The differences may appear to be purely technical or based
on engineering, but in fact they represent very different ways of thinking
about the relationship of public goods, economic development, and society. Brazil, for example, uses dedicated bus
lanes to mimic, at significantly lower cost, the rapidity and ease of light
rail. Egypt, which once had its
own bus manufacturing capacity, could have done something similar. The use of cars and privately owned
buses has been a boon to cab drivers, auto importers, and investors in
mini-buses. To more than 85 million
other Egyptians, not so much.
No comments:
Post a Comment